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The untold story of how philanthropy  
and the Civil Marriage Collaborative helped 
America embrace marriage equality
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There were many forces at work in this historic change: tenacious leaders and  
litigators, coalitions of diverse lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT)  
organizations, straight individual and organizational allies, elected officials,  
celebrities, and most important, hundreds of thousands of individuals, couples 
and families at the grassroots level.
Another force that played a critical but largely unknown role in all of this was philan-
thropy, especially the Civil Marriage Collaborative (CMC), a consortium of foundations 
that pooled and leveraged their resources and strategically aligned their grantmaking. 
Over an 11-year period, their investments of $153 million enabled organizations in 
many states and at the national level to change hearts and minds on a massive scale – 
and ultimately help advance marriage equality.
In sharing this case study, our goal is to inform colleagues across the social justice 
philanthropy universe about lessons learned from philanthropy’s and the CMC’s  
role in advancing marriage equality, in the hopes that such insights can assist in 
shaping future successful social change efforts in other equally pressing arenas.
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2May 1970  
 Baker and McConnell  
denied marriage license 
 in Minnesota.
September 1996  
President Clinton  
signs DOMA.
1993 
 Hawaii Supreme Court 
rules that denying marriage 
to same-sex couples was 
unconstitutional.
1991 
  Lawsuit filed in Hawaii by three 
same-sex couples.
The battle for marriage equality began on May 18, 
1970, when a Minnesota couple, Richard Baker and 
James Michael McConnell, unsuccessfully sought a mar-
riage license at the Hennepin County clerk’s office. The 
case was litigated up to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
refused to even hear it on its merits. The issue lay largely 
dormant for two decades 
with negligible attention 
from LGBT organizations or 
funders. It gained momen-
tum, however, in the early 
1990s, when a Hawaii court 
found that the state could 
not prove that denying mar-
riage to same-sex couples 
furthered a compelling state 
interest, the standard set by 
the Hawaii Supreme Court.
The decision (overturned in 1998 by an unprece-
dented state constitutional referendum that allowed 
the state legislature to “restrict marriage to opposite-sex 
couples”) sent shockwaves across the country. In the 
face of feverish, anti-equality rhetoric that soon all 
states would have to recognize marriages performed in 
Hawaii, Congress passed and President Clinton signed 
the so-called Defense of Marriage Act in 1996. The  
measure defined marriage as a union between a man 
and a woman and prohibited the federal government 
from recognizing same-sex marriages or extending to 
gay and lesbian couples any of the more than 1,100 
federal rights and benefits associated with marriage.
The Defense of Marriage Act did not, however, kill 
the marriage equality movement. In 2000, following 
a wrenching public debate, Vermont created “civil 
unions,” extending to same-sex couples all of the rights 
and responsibilities given to straight couples under 
state law. The next year, Evan Wolfson, who had been 
co-counsel in the 1993 Hawaii case, received the first-ever 
marriage equality grant from the Evelyn and Walter 
Haas, Jr. Fund in San Francisco to create Freedom to 
Marry, the organization that would become the engine 
of the marriage equality movement.
In late 2003, the movement notched its most 
important victory yet: A ruling by the highest court 
in Massachusetts that the state’s ban on same-sex 
marriage was unconstitutional. The justices gave the 
state legislature 180 days to update the Bay State’s 
laws to conform to the ruling.
This watershed moment triggered another media 
and political firestorm akin to the post-Hawaii reaction. 
Baker and McConnell applying for marriage license in 
Hennepin County, MN. 
Minnesota Historical Society
William Grieb
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  Massachusetts’s high court finds ban on 
same-sex marriage unconstitutional.
2000  
Vermont approves 
civil unions. 
Suddenly, “gay marriage” was in the headlines coast-to-
coast. In his 2004 State of the Union Address, President 
George W. Bush called for amending the U.S. Constitu-
tion to define marriage as the union between a man and 
a woman. Other forces opposed to marriage equality 
– and to the entire LGBT civil rights agenda in general –
promised to put similar constitutional amendments on 
the 2004 ballots in more than a dozen states. 
It was clear to anyone with a working knowledge of 
the LGBT movement that it did not have the financial 
or operational capacity to confront this multi-state on-
slaught and mount the larger public education, policy 
advocacy and litigation effort to hold onto victories in 
the courts and see them implemented, let alone push 
marriage equality over the finish line nationally. In 
retrospect, LGBT groups and allied civil rights orga-
nizations did not know how to communicate effec-
tively with elected officials and policymakers, or the 
general public, about the importance of the freedom 
to marry and about how recognizing this right for 
same-sex couples would not harm others. 
This was the context in which a handful of foun-
dations came together in 2004 to create the Civil 
Marriage Collaborative, housed at and staffed by the 
Proteus Fund. Over the next 11 years, this unique 
collaborative and its partners would bring a total 
of $153 million to build and strengthen a broad 
and diverse grassroots constituency and powerful 
public education apparatus to advance the marriage 
equality movement. Just as important, the CMC and 
its funders would play a critical role in helping the 
LGBT movement develop, coalesce around and pur-
sue a shared strategy to secure the freedom to marry 
state-by-state and then nationwide.
“In the climate of the early 2000s, there was a collec-
tive realization that one good legal argument made in 
front of an open-minded judge, even if successful, wasn’t 
enough,” said Paul Di Donato, director of the CMC.
“And the only way to achieve and 
defend a marriage equality victory 
nationwide was to take on the biggest 
challenge that was out there: changing 
the hearts and minds of Americans 
about the rightful place of LGBT  
people in our society and, flowing 
from that, the compelling story of 
why marriage matters for us.” 
Marriage equality 
supporters mounted a 
successful campaign to 
keep the Massachusetts 
legislature from putting 
a constitutional amend-
ment banning same-sex 
marriage on the ballot. 
Tim Pierce
4February 2004  
President Bush endorses 
constitutional ban on  
same-sex marriage.
There had never been a meeting like it.
In February 2005, inside the red-
bricked headquarters of the Gill Foundation in Denver, 
26 national LGBT leaders sat at a table. Ringed around 
them were representatives of the original funders of 
the Civil Marriage Collaborative: the David Bohnett 
Foundation, the Columbia Foundation, the Evelyn and 
Walter Haas, Jr. Fund, the Gill Foundation, the Open 
Society Institute, the Overbrook Foundation, and an 
anonymous funder.
At first, the session was rather awkward – movement 
leaders were not used to putting all of their cards on 
the table, particularly with most of the movement’s 
major foundation funders looking on. But most every-
one in the room believed that if everyone present,  
including the funders, did not collaborate on a deep 
level and come up with a common game plan, marriage 
equality was not likely to advance much further. 
“This was actually the first time that the leading 
funders of the gay rights movement had organized a 
meeting of leading gay rights organizations,” said Matt 
Foreman, then executive director of the National Gay 
and Lesbian Task Force and now a senior program 
director at the Haas, Jr. Fund, the first foundation in 
America to invest in marriage equality. “It was an in-
credibly significant moment at an incredibly low time 
for the gay movement.”
Only months earlier, in November 2004, the LGBT 
movement had experienced gut-wrenching setbacks at 
the polls, just as the CMC, other key LGBT grantmakers 
and LGBT leaders had feared. Anti-marriage measures 
passed in 11 states, by an average margin of 70% to 
30%. The election defeats marked something that 
had never happened on such a scale in our nation’s 
post-Civil War history: voters affirmatively taking away 
rights from a minority – rights that the minority had 
yet to even realize. 
 • Anonymous Donors
 • The Atlantic Philanthropies
 • Calamus Foundation (DE)
 • Calamus Foundation (NY)
 • Columbia Foundation
 • David Bohnett Foundation
 • Evelyn and Walter Haas, Jr. Fund
 • Ford Foundation
 • Gill Foundation
 • Horizons Foundation
 • Johnson Family Foundation
 • Kevin J. Mossier Foundation
 • Open Society Foundations
 • The Overbrook Foundation
2003  
Freedom to Marry  
launched by Evan Wolfson.
CMC FUNDING 
PARTNERS
February 2004  
San Francisco issues 
marriage licenses  
to same-sex couples.
5“Perhaps these developments should not have 
been too surprising. Like other social justice efforts, 
marriage equality experienced early successes 
through litigation, but the movement was incapable 
of defending its wins in the court of public opin-
ion,” said Di Donato, the CMC director. “Litigation 
is almost always one important piece of the puzzle, 
but there are other, equally critical elements: from 
mobilizing support from the LGBT ‘base’ and allies 
to crafting effective media campaigns – all as part of 
a broadly defined comprehensive public education 
initiative to change hearts and minds on a massive 
scale. Back in 2004, these elements were not fully 
developed at all, and it showed.”
In the aftermath of these setbacks, it was time for a 
complete reset on marriage. The question for the move-
ment was: Could it unite, go on the offensive and do so 
in sophisticated and effective ways? And, if it did, where 
would the resources come from to fuel such an effort?
In Denver, the movement leaders agreed to work 
on a shared vision for securing the freedom to marry, 
and Matt Coles, the director of the ACLU’s LGBT and 
AIDS Project at the time, was charged with leading 
the project. There was also an explicit understanding 
that if the movement coalesced around a shared 
strategy, foundations would provide resources to 
implement it.
By the summer of 2005, the strategy paper – which 
reflected the thinking of many movement leaders – had 
been vetted and endorsed by all the groups. It 
envisioned a plan to move the nation to a “tipping 
point” on marriage within 20 years by securing 
marriage equality in 10 states, getting 10 other states to 
embrace civil unions, another 10 states with some 
form of legal recognition of same-sex cou-ples, and at 
least some pro-equality organizing in the remaining 20 
states. 
In November 2004, anti-marriage amendments passed in 11 states, for a total of 13 that year.
In 2004, its first grant year, the CMC 
made 19 grants totaling $935,000, 
funding 17 organizations in 10 states. 
6This “10/10/10/20” strategy was based on the path 
that several other social justice movements had taken 
to advance to a national resolution on their issues, 
especially when the likeliest national resolution was a 
U.S. Supreme Court victory. For example, most states 
had lifted their bans on interracial marriage by the time 
of the Supreme Court’s Loving v. Virginia ruling in 1967, 
and the same went for a women’s right to choose by the 
time of the Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade ruling in 1973. 
The “10/10/10/20” strategy had three important premises: 
First, it recognized that moving forward on marriage 
would require multiple strategies, including litigation, 
public education, research and grassroots organizing, 
lobbying and electoral work. This allowed for broad 
buy-in by LGBT organizations with different areas  
of expertise. 
Second, the strategy recognized that there was a 
role for different kinds of funders for the different 
strategies. For example, private foundations – which 
comprised most of the CMC funding partners -- could 
support public education, community organizing and 
research, but are barred by law from any involvement 
in lobbying or political campaigns. On the other 
hand, individuals and public charities, including, 
for example, the Proteus Action League (PAL) or Gill 
Action could (to the extent permitted by law) bring  
c4 resources to bear in lobbying policymakers and  
in ballot measure campaigns. 
Third, “10/10/10/20” was explicitly focused on state-
based efforts, given that marriage had traditionally 
been a state-defined and regulated institution, and the 
battleground clearly would remain at the state level for 
the foreseeable future. 
Over the next decade, the “10/10/10/20” vision 
would become the overarching strategic framework 
for the larger marriage equality movement and the 
CMC and its funding partners. By aligning all their 
marriage-related grantmaking behind this shared 
game plan, the partners were able to exponentially in-
crease the impact of the $153 million they put into the 
effort, including the $20 million invested in the CMC. 
“Over the next decade, the ‘10/10/10/20’ vision would become 
the overarching strategic framework for the larger marriage 
equality movement and the CMC and its funding partners.”  
PAUL DI DONATO, DIRECTOR, CMC
March 2004 
 CMC founded.
March 2004  
 Multnomah County in Oregon 
(Portland) issues marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples.
May 2004  
 First same-sex couples marry 
in Massachusetts. 
7August 2004  
California Supreme Court annuls  
San Francisco’s same-sex marriages.
“It was a very big deal for the LGBT movement to 
come together to support a bold, long-term vision 
for winning marriage equality,” said Stephen Foster, 
president and CEO of the Overbrook Foundation. 
“And it became even more important as the years 
went by to say this is the plan we agreed to, and  
we were going to stick with it.”
With a blueprint in hand and a commitment from  
the CMC and its funders to back it up with money,  
the movement could soldier on, but the terrain was still 
very rough. In 2005 and 2006, voters in an additional 
nine states passed anti-equality state constitutional 
amendments, again by overwhelming margins. 
“It was a very big deal for the LGBT movement to come 
together to support a bold, long-term vision for winning 
marriage equality.” STEPHEN FOSTER, PRESIDENT AND CEO, OVERBROOK FOUNDATION
In 2004, when San 
Francisco Mayor Gavin 
Newsom ordered the 
city to issue marriage 
licenses to same-sex 
couples, longtime lesbi-
an activists Del Martin 
and Phyllis Lyon were 
the first to wed, only for 
the California Supreme 
Court to annul their 
marriage, and those of 
4,000 other couples. But 
four years later, Phyllis 
and Del (pictured 
in their June 2008 
wedding) were married 
for good. Del died two 
months later.
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2004  
Voters in 13 states adopt anti- 
marriage ballot measures.
8April 2009   
Iowa’s Supreme Court 
extends the freedom 
to marry to same-sex 
couples.
May 2008  
California Supreme Court over-
turns ban on same-sex marriage; 
18,000 couples marry.
A study supported by the Gill Foundation offered a so-
bering explanation for why same-sex marriage was strug-
gling at the ballot box: 57% of Americans believed that 
gay Americans did not share their basic values. Why was 
that? It was a question that would take years to answer.
 “We were shocked when we discovered this values 
gap,” said Tim Sweeney, former president of the Gill 
Foundation and one of the original founders of the CMC 
while he was at the Haas, Jr. Fund. “We were like, why 
do they say that? What do they think our values are? As it 
turned out, our opponents had successfully painted us as 
unconnected, free-floating atoms who weren’t connected 
to family, society or society’s institutions.”
To this point, LGBT groups had been relying on 
polling that didn’t probe what was really going on in 
people’s heads when they thought about gay people and 
“gay marriage.” These polls showed that most people 
wanted gay people to 
have equal “rights,” so 
most of the movement’s 
messaging focused on 
the rights and benefits 
associated with mar-
riage, but that message 
wasn’t breaking through. 
So, beginning in 2006-
07, the CMC and some 
of its funder members 
began investing in deep 
psychographic research in California, where it  
appeared that the state Supreme Court would over-
turn the state’s statutory ban on same-sex marriage. 
The hope was to change hearts and minds to support 
the freedom to marry before anti-equality forces 
would, inevitably, attempt to overturn such a decision 
via the ballot box. This research involved focus 
groups, multi-hour interviews, ad development and 
testing, and rounds of surveys. 
The trouble was, research of this scope and quality 
was expensive – an initial investment was 10 times 
the cost of a typical statewide poll. It also took more 
time than expected and had its own bumps along the 
way. For example, most of the early test ads fell flat. In 
late 2007, a spot called “The Garden Wedding” finally 
showed some promise.
This non-political ad was not based on a rights  
rationale for the freedom to marry. It did not even  
specifically mention same-sex marriage. Instead, it 
was about framing the debate in the context of the 
Golden Rule and eliciting empathy – asking straight 
people to think about what it would be like if they 
could not get married to the person they loved.
Unfortunately, there was only enough funding to 
combine running the ad in significant “rotation” with 
related on-the-ground organizing in just one media 
market in California: Santa Barbara. Did it work to 
change hearts and minds on marriage? It appears that 
it did: Santa Barbara ended up being the only county 
in Southern California to reject the anti-marriage 
amendment Proposition 8. But statewide, it was too 
little, too late.
A 2005 poll found that a majority of Americans 
believed that gay people did not share their values.
October 2008   
Connecticut’s Supreme Court 
rules same-sex couples must have 
the freedom to marry.
November 2008  
California voters pass Prop. 8.
CMC grantmaking in the 2006-07 
period increased to approximately 
$1.5 million per year, the number of 
grants went up (24 in 2006) as did the 
number of organizations funded and 
the number of states involved. Average 
grant size was $71,000. The CMC later 
decided that these resources were 
being spread too thin across too many 
organizations and states to create 
scaled-up and meaningful impact. 
CMC GRANTMAKING
9November 2009  
Freedom to marry law over-
turned by voters in Maine.
Heartbreaking 
losses in Maine 
and California
Starting in 2005, the CMC and its partners had 
invested in messaging research and public education 
efforts in California, a key battleground state. In 2008, 
however, Prop. 8, a measure to amend the California 
Constitution to ban same-sex marriage, passed 52% to 
48% in California, a “liberal” state where many thought 
such an outcome could not happen, particularly when 
the pro-marriage political campaign spent a record $42 
million to defeat it. It was a huge blow to the country’s 
marriage equality movement.
“It was a very low moment and cause for a lot of reflec-
tion on what went wrong,” said Roger Doughty, executive 
director of Horizons Foundation in San Francisco. “It took 
a lot of patience and collective hand holding within the 
CMC – and of course within the larger freedom to marry 
effort – to avoid key players beating a hasty retreat. Had 
funding collapsed in any significant way, who knows 
where we would be today on marriage equality.”
Many blamed the Prop. 8 loss on the way the political 
campaign to defeat it was managed and to a lesser 
extent on California’s size and related organizing chal-
lenges, not on the campaign’s messaging content and 
delivery mechanisms. 
Things were supposed to get better the next year in 
Maine, a much smaller state whose residents were far 
more homogeneous and far less religious than Califor-
nia’s. The Maine Legislature passed marriage equality 
but Maine allows for voters to veto laws passed by the 
legislature. So, in another key setback, the results were 
the same. When opponents trotted out the same disingen-
uous ads claiming that same-sex marriage would harm 
kids, the equality effort went down in flames by virtually 
the same margin as Prop. 8 – 53% to 47%. This led some 
to begin to wonder whether public education efforts could 
move hearts and minds on the freedom to marry.
Yet through it all, the CMC and its funders stayed the 
course. “Losses like this often chill funder enthusiasm 
and turn philanthropic focus to other issues or spend-
ing unproductive energy fretting over what happened,” 
Di Donato said. “Not marriage and not the CMC.” 
Instead of finger pointing at itself, its grantees or  
anyone else, the collaborative focused on supporting  
the movement to get smarter, sharper and more  
sophisticated. In its postmortem of the California  
and Maine losses, the CMC concluded that the failure 
was not caused by the management of the efforts or 
random tactical issues; the problem was that the pub-
lic education arm of the movement and the political 
campaign apparatus were not changing hearts and 
minds quickly enough or in large enough volume. 
A CMC funder-sponsored study had shown that 
voters moved very little once the pure “political  
campaign” got underway. So, clearly, the only way 
to move forward was to implement a much more  
effective and truly multi-dimensional public  
education, non-political strategy well before a  
measure appeared on the ballot. 
“That was a watershed moment,” Di Donato said. 
“The message that this sent to the CMC, Freedom 
to Marry and all of our key partners and colleagues 
was this was a devastating loss, but one of the 
problems here is that we did not fund to scale; fund 
early enough; or adequately fund specific coalition 
building and outreach efforts, especially on the faith, 
communities of color and business fronts. The result 
was a failure to move enough people who want to do 
the right thing, but keep coming down on the other 
side when hit with the message that ‘gay marriage’ 
would harm kids or permanently and negatively alter 
marriage as an institution.”
Kelly B. Huston
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 From the ashes of the California and Maine defeats, 
the CMC honed its funding strategies even further. 
On the surface, the passage of Prop. 8 appeared to be 
an epic victory for opponents of same-sex marriage. But 
it had the opposite effect. It shocked and outraged LGBT 
people and their allies across the country, and ignited 
pro-marriage equality efforts in a dozen states.  
Philanthropists and activists seized these openings. 
There was a renewed commitment from the CMC, 
other funders, and LGBT activists to double down on 
research, polling and the resulting messaging efforts 
crafted from such work. To apply these many lessons 
learned, it was clear that the CMC had to concentrate 
resources and create even greater focus so that all efforts 
would reach scale and thus have a major impact. 
In moving forward, it was also clear that the national 
marriage movement itself needed to have greater focus 
and discipline. The only logical choice to carry out this 
task was Freedom to Marry.
“For the funders, we needed a scale-up of this cen-
tralization, technical assistance and coaching effort to 
enable every effort in key states to take advantage of 
all the lessons learned in the previous few years,” said 
Sweeney, one of the CMC founders.
When it was first created, Freedom to Marry had not 
been intended to be a big new national LGBT organi-
zation competing for scarce resources. “It was going to 
be a small ship, the glue that held the 
movement together, a behind-the-
scenes cajoler and convener and re-grantor, an adviser 
to funders,” Sweeney said.
With assistance from key funding institutions and in-
dividual major donors, Freedom to Marry went from a 
five-person outfit to a 40-person organization. Its budget 
grew from about $3 million to more than $12 million in 
a short period of time. Freedom to Marry became a true 
out-front national organization, with both c3 (public 
education) and c4 (lobbying and ballot work) capacities.
“ ‘Freedom to Marry 2.0’ provided the best expertise 
and personnel to help design and execute everything 
needed to move the ball forward,” said Charlie Rounds 
of the Kevin J. Mossier Foundation. “Freedom to Marry 
supported these efforts from A to Z; and it coordinat-
ed the use and growth of much more sophisticated 
research, message development and message delivery.  
It also crafted practical templates and toolkits that could 
be adapted state by state on everything from effective 
grassroots organizing to tested approaches on organizing 
people of color, faith and business leaders and commu-
nities. In sum, the expanded role of Freedom to Marry 
would have profound implications for the CMC in its 
state-by-state strategy.”
For starters, the CMC started looking at Maine and 
other key states where the marriage equality effort 
could go on the offensive. As had been decided earlier, 
the strategy was to start public education campaigns 
well in advance of any electoral work, provide sufficient 
time to test and refine messaging and make larger and 
more strategic investments to ensure that all tactics 
A 2010 CNN poll found that, for the first time, a 
majority of Americans supported marriage equality.
June 2011  
New York enacts  
marriage equality law. 
May 2010  
Gay & Lesbian Advocates 
& Defenders challenge the 
constitutionality of DOMA.
December 2010  
Congress repeals  
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” 
collierphoto.com
11
CMC GRANT DOLLARS 
DISTRIBUTED BY STATE
 Total distribution for state 
work: $19,386,159
Grants for national work and 
special projects not included
$100,000 AZ
$1,530,000 CA 
$200,000 CO
$804,308 CT
$160,000 DE
$240,000 DC
$200,000 FL
$125,000 GA
$160,000 HI
$225,000 IL
$1,152,000 IA
$75,000 KY
$430,000 MA
$850,000 MD
$2,021,027 ME
could be brought to scale. With Freedom to Marry, the 
CMC for the first time created an important bench-
marking process to guide both entities’ investments 
and those of its partners in state-specific efforts. 
The goal was to focus in states where either pro- or 
anti-equality ballot measures loomed on the horizon, 
but there was still time for public education efforts to 
move a majority of the population to support marriage 
equality. Then, as the ballot initiative or legislative 
campaign geared up and Election Day got closer, the 
public education efforts funded by the CMC and 
others would wind down, and c4 and non-private 
foundation dollars would be used to push marriage 
equality over the finish line.
As a result, the CMC began requiring any state 
seeking support to gauge its baseline of public  
support for marriage by using a trusted 
pollster asking a specific series of 
questions proven to yield accurate 
results. Then, a state needed to come 
forward with sound public education 
and fundraising plans showing that it 
could increase public support for mar-
riage from its baseline to between 51% 
to 53% within a fixed period of time. 
States that could not demonstrate this 
capacity did not receive CMC funding. 
 “More than ever, the CMC became a financial 
gatekeeper of the resources going to the states, with 
the CMC funder partners aligning their individual 
marriage-related grants to be synergistic with  
CMC efforts and with other individual large donors 
looking to see what the CMC was doing,” Di Donato 
said. “That’s a challenging and delicate role to play,  
but our benchmarking processes as well as close  
partnerships with our own grantees helped make  
it as informed, fair, disciplined and objective  
as possible.”
During this time, the CMC cut the number of grants 
it awarded, but those grants were sub stantially larger to 
those states that qualified. In Washington state, for ex-
ample, the CMC granted close to $400,000 for marriage 
equality efforts in the state, with CMC partner foun-
dations pitching in an even greater 
amount through independent grants.
“We had come to appreciate,”  
Foster said, “that changing hearts 
and minds through public education 
efforts could in fact work, but only 
with significant levels of targeted 
resources and real commitment for 
the funds to be used in data-driven, 
proven ways.”
In 11 years,  
the CMC made 
187 grants  
in 29 states  
and D.C.
$325,000 MI
$575,000 MN
$119,642 NV
$345,333 NH
$1,263,017 NJ
$650,000 NM
$1,225,000 NY
$150,000 NC
$275,000 OH
$2,676,000 OR
$1,331,412 RI
$375,000 TX
$446,920 VT
$956,500 WA
$400,000 WI 
The CMC ramped up its 
focus by providing larger 
grants to fewer states. 
From 2010 to 2011, the 
number of states receiving 
support dropped from 10 
to 5 and grants increased 
almost 75%, from an aver-
age of $197,000 per state 
to $342,000. 
CMC GRANTMAKING
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November 2012  
Voters in four states back 
same-sex marriage.
May 2012  
North Carolina voters adopt  
anti-marriage ban 61% to 39%.
With significant CMC support, advocates began 
intensive testing first in Oregon and Maine – Maine 
because it seemed to present the ideal state to rebound 
with a better public education approach, and Oregon 
because its lead organization, Basic Rights Education 
Fund, was particularly adept at testing messages 
and message delivery tactics. Their mission: craft a 
message and find the best ways to deliver that message 
that would connect with the people – straight people.
This involved sophisticated, 
direct-mail pieces; going to the 
door with iPads and showing 
different non-political ads to 
speak to different audiences; 
and both phone and door-to-
door canvassing. As every-
one now knew, most of the 
movement’s messages through 
2009 had been based on rights 
and responsibilities. It wasn’t 
working.
A revelatory moment came 
during a poll conducted by 
LGBT forces in Oregon. In the 
survey, straight voters were 
asked why they got married, and 
they said for love and commit-
ment. They were asked why gay 
people got married, and they 
said “for rights and benefits.”
“The other side was going for the gut,” 
said Amy Mello, field director for Free-
dom to Marry. “We were responding 
from the head, as if marriage was about 
getting a better dental plan.”
“We weren’t telling the story that gay couples valued 
marriage for the same reasons: love and commitment,” 
Mello said. Most straight people wanted to be fair to 
gay people, Mello said, but they were conflicted. That’s 
when field workers in Maine began conducting tens  
of thousands of “persuasion” conservations.
“When we made an emotional connection around 
shared values,” Mello said, “we gave conflicted Maine 
residents a way to override the negative reaction to 
the attack ads claiming kids would be harmed by ‘gay 
marriage’ and come back to their better selves. We were 
tipping the scales of their conflicted feelings so that their 
feelings on our side were winning out.”
Ads and messaging based on this research were test-
ed and re-tested in both Oregon and Maine. It turned 
out that the most effective messengers weren’t gay 
couples, but rather parents or grandparents of gay and 
lesbian people who had been married for decades. By 
sharing their journey from being uncomfortable with 
homosexuality to wanting their gay or lesbian child to 
be able to share the love and commitment they’d had 
with their spouses, they showed conflicted residents 
a way forward. 
IMPACT IN NEW YORK
The CMC assessed the factors that  
led to New York state enacting 
marriage equality in 2011, following 
a bruising 2009 loss. The evaluation 
found that the CMC’s total grants 
of nearly $1.3 million to the Empire 
State Pride Foundation helped lay the 
groundwork for increased support for 
marriage equality — by enabling the 
organization to build coalitions and a 
public education infrastructure.
PUBLIC EDUCATION
On the opening night of the 2012 
Olympics, marriage advocates in 
Washington state launched a five-
week public education advertising 
campaign with CMC support,  
increasing public support for marriage 
equality by one to three points. 
May 2012  
President Obama announces he 
supports the freedom to marry.
Pete Souza 
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Public support 
for marriage 
equality from 
1988 to 2015.
MAINE
WASHINGTON
MINNESOTA
MARYLAND
In the case of Maine, these ads – which never asked 
anyone to vote one way or another on any potential 
ballot measure – hit home and moved the needle for 
equality long before any ballot initiative hit the state 
for the second time. From mid-2011 to late summer of 
2012, support for marriage in Maine climbed from 47% 
to 53%. Moreover, polling done after Maine’s second 
ballot vote on marriage equality in 2012 showed that 
people in Maine remembered these moving “journey” 
ads more than any of the ads in the political campaign. 
Similar polling results confirmed this finding in Oregon. 
The LGBT movement had finally found the way to move 
hearts and minds on marriage. 
In Minnesota by 2012, marriage equality advocates 
knew they would face a new effort to ban the freedom 
to marry in that state. Because of recent research funded 
by the CMC and others, as well as in-state experience, 
Minnesota advocates also understood that they could 
not let the anti-equality forces “own” the faith issue, and 
that they needed to be able to raise up and organize a 
strong array of faith voices for equality. 
As such, high priority was given within the public 
education outreach strategy to the early development of 
a nine-member faith team – with strong local ties – that 
was involved in all strategy conversations. Eventually 
this faith team transitioned smoothly from the public 
education side of the work to purely c4 engagement as 
the actual ballot fight drew near. 
In Washington state, CMC and other funding aligned 
with the CMC grants supported similar extensive 
community outreach and organizing. Three target 
demographics were identified for public education 
organizing: families with children; communities of 
color; and people of faith. The families and children 
effort stemmed from the need to defend against the 
anticipated opposition ads that messaged “exposing 
threats” to children and parental rights. The com-
munities of color efforts aimed to raise the visibility 
of LGBT people and the freedom to marry in the 
four key communities of color in the state – African 
American, Asian and Pacific Islander, Latino, and 
Native American. This was done through efforts 
to mobilize trusted organizations and individuals 
of color within their own communities; soliciting 
endorsements from leading state people of color 
organizations and community leaders; elevating 
the voice of LGBT people of color within their 
own communities; and developing media outreach 
tailored linguistically and culturally to communities 
of color.
On Nov. 6, 2012, voters in Maine, Maryland, and 
Washington endorsed marriage equality, and voters 
in Minnesota rejected the proposed ban on same-
sex marriage. This was the first time that same-sex 
marriage had won at the ballot box. 
It was one of most satisfying days in the history of 
the entire LGBT movement, and a day of validation 
for the CMC, its funding partners and the advocates 
who had crafted and executed the winning “tool-
box” that finally led to victory. The CMC commis-
sioned an evaluation on the impact of public edu-
cation funding in the four 2012 ballot win states.  
It also found that the CMC’s and related funding 
had a major positive impact in changing hearts 
and minds through the revamped messaging and 
message delivery mechanisms, including targeted 
cross-issue alliance building.
More good news was just around the corner.
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Marriage wins at  
the ballot in Maine, 
Maryland, Minnesota, 
and Washington. 
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June 2013  
The Supreme Court’s 
Windsor decision  
effectively guts DOMA.
November 2013  
Illinois enacts a  
marriage equality law.
When the CMC was born, its focus on state-based 
efforts did not include support for marriage-related 
litigation for two reasons: state work needed resources 
the most, and the movement needed to demonstrate 
broad public support for equality. That said, almost  
all of the CMC’s funders provided significant support 
for four national LGBT legal groups through their 
own grantmaking. 
Following the basic tenet of the 
“10/10/10/20” vision, the national 
LGBT legal groups and leading LGBT 
organizations were in no rush, in any 
event, to take the “big question” of mar-
riage equality to the Supreme Court 
before same-sex marriage reached a 
critical mass in the states. An unfavor-
able decision in the high court would 
set the movement back by 20 years or 
more, so the timing had to be right. 
 And so came the Windsor ruling in 
2013. Years earlier, movement organi-
zations had been persuaded to back a 
strategy developed by the Gay & Lesbian Advocates & 
Defenders (GLAD), and later the ACLU, Lambda Legal 
and the National Center for Lesbian Rights, to surgically 
attack the section of the Defense of Marriage Act that 
prohibited the federal government from recognizing 
same-sex marriages performed in the states. The think-
ing was two-fold. First, because the federal government 
had (except in rare situations) deferred to the states in 
matrimonial issues, the law was on the movement’s side. 
Second, even if pro-equality forces lost in the courts,  
including the Supreme Court, it would be far less devas-
tating than losing on the “big” constitutional question.
It was a careful, plodding and un-dramatic legal  
strategy, but over time, it consistently won in district  
and circuit courts – and primed the Supreme Court  
for a knockout decision. 
Edith Windsor was the lead 
plaintiff in the Supreme Court 
case, United States v. Windsor, 
which, when she won, gutted 
DOMA, and opened the door 
to ending state-based bans on 
same-sex marriage. 
Donna F. Aceto
2012  
Federal district and circuit 
courts rule that DOMA is 
unconstitutional. 
June 2012  
The Supreme Court lets a court 
decision overturning Prop. 8 go 
into effect, extending the  
freedom to marry to California.
The 10/10/10/20 strategy 
envisioned winning some 
states through state-
based litigation where 
state constitutional 
provisions and the courts 
appeared to be most fa-
vorable. The state courts 
in Connecticut and Iowa 
did rule for equality in 
2008 and 2009, respec-
tively. But the approach 
was unsuccessful in three 
other promising states, 
Maryland, New York and 
Washington state. In 
closely decided decisions 
between 2006 and 2007, 
the high court in each of 
these states ruled that 
same-sex couples were 
not entitled to the free-
dom to marry under state 
constitutional law.
STATE-BASED LITIGATION
The home stretch
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“This is truly a day of celebration for loving and committed same-sex couples and their  
families – and for all of us who believe in the American journey to equality under the law 
and the pursuit of happiness, with liberty and justice for all. The Supreme Court’s mortal 
blow to DOMA puts the moral weight of the federal government on the side of all Americans 
who seek to share in the freedom to marry and all its protections and responsibilities.”  
EVAN WOLFSON, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, FREEDOM TO MARRY
 The Windsor case centered on New York resident 
Edith Windsor, who was legally married in Canada 
in 2007 to Thea Spyer, her partner of 40 years. Upon 
Spyer’s death in 2009, Windsor sought a federal estate 
tax exemption extended to all married couples but was 
turned down because of Section 3 of the Defense of 
Marriage Act, which stated that the term “spouse” only 
applied to a marriage between a man and a woman.
The Supreme Court took up Edie’s case, and she won. 
The ruling gutted DOMA, effectively ending federal dis-
crimination against same-sex couples. Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion also opened the door for challenging 
the constitutionality of all the state-based bans on same-
sex marriage. This was the beginning of the end for 
state-based bans on same-sex marriage.
After the Windsor decision, litigation challenging 
the constitutionality of state-based bans on same-sex 
marriage exploded, some brought by the national LGBT 
legal groups, but many more by private attorneys. All 
had the same goal: putting before the Supreme Court the 
ultimate question: Does denying the freedom to marry to 
same-sex couples violate the U.S. Constitution? The only 
question was whether and when the high court would 
take a case to decide the ultimate question. 
No one, including the CMC, was sure the Supreme 
Court would come down on the side of marriage equal-
ity. As a result, the CMC continued funding all forms of 
public education work, especially in states like Colorado, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Mexico and Oregon that, 
for one reason or another, could or would be on the front 
lines if the Supreme Court decision went the wrong way. 
The CMC also decided to be nimble, change its litiga-
tion funding position, and funnel a significant amount of 
money for the first time in its history into the litigation 
strategy. “We knew that the national LGBT legal groups 
needed those resources to analyze all this litigation and 
help shape it all in a comprehensive way to make sure that 
as many decisions as possible came down on the side of 
equality and that the best possible cases would get to the 
Supreme Court,” said CMC director Di Donato. “The CMC 
had to make sure that we did everything possible to ensure 
favorable outcomes, including continued public education 
funding to help create the best possible public opinion 
environment for the ideal ruling.”
By March 20, 2015, marriage equality was the law in 37 states. 
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June 2015  
Supreme Court rules that denying 
same-sex couples the freedom to  
marry violates the U.S. Constitution.
To ensure the success of litigation, the CMC joined 
with four of its funders to pump more than $1 million 
in new dollars to the four national LGBT legal groups to 
pursue their own freedom to marry cases and provide 
technical and other assistance to the numerous cases 
being litigated by private attorneys. 
The case eventually taken 
up by the Supreme Court was 
a plaintiff lawyer’s dream. 
Ohio resident James Oberge-
fell was forced to fly his 
dying partner, John Arthur, 
to Maryland and get married 
on an airport tarmac because 
same-sex marriage was not 
legal in Ohio. Arthur, who 
had suffered from ALS, died several weeks later,  
but Ohio refused to allow Obergefell to be identified 
as a surviving spouse on Arthur’s death certificate. 
Obergefell sued, on the basis that Ohio was discrim-
inating against same-sex couples who had legally 
married outside the state.
As Di Donato said: “You could not create out of thin 
air a better fact pattern that you would want to have in 
front of a court to say, ‘Now, explain to us why and how 
it’s constitutionally permissible to have this happening 
in 2015 America?’”
A majority of the Supreme Court justices couldn’t 
explain that – and on June 26, 2015, the nation’s high 
court made same-sex marriage the law of the land.  
It was a landmark civil rights victory.
“The CMC created efficiency, focus, 
clarity and strategic alignment  
in the funding. The overarching 
campaign for marriage equality 
eventually had all of these elements 
as well. That’s why we won.” 
ANDREW LANE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 
JOHNSON FAMILY FOUNDATION
Charlotte Fiorito / Compass Photographers
Ohio residents Jim Obergefell and John Arthur, who 
suffered from ALS, flew to Maryland in July 2013 to 
get married since they could not legally wed in Ohio. 
Jim was the lead plaintiff in the Supreme Court case 
that made marriage equality the law of the land. 
R Kurtz
The final step
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And it happened so quickly. To put it in perspective, 
many inside the LGBT movement had worried that the 
“10/10/10/20” vision – whose stated goal in 2005 was 
to have same-sex marriage legal in 10 states by 2020 – 
was wildly ambitious. Well, it was 2015, and same-sex 
marriage was now legal in all 50 states.
All along, there had been amazing advocates on the 
ground and a tremendous grassroots energy, but that 
energy had to be channeled. It needed a vision, a focus, 
and a plan. That’s how the CMC, and the philanthropic 
world, contributed to this historic social change.
“The foundation dollars were critical in making 
it clear that this issue had substance and backing,” 
Andrew Lane, executive director of the Johnson Family 
Foundation, said. “That sent a powerful message to key 
marriage supporters and to key individuals and organi-
zations sitting on the fence. And it also sent a message 
to the opposition. The CMC created efficiency, focus, 
clarity and strategic alignment in the funding. The 
overarching campaign for marriage equality eventually 
had all of these elements as well. That’s why we won.”
Foreman, of the Haas Jr. Fund, added: “If there isn’t 
that vision, that plan, and that campaign, you’re going to 
be generating a lot of heat but not necessarily a positive 
outcome. You can see overwhelming support for gun 
control, and yet it isn’t going anywhere. You see majority 
support for reproductive freedom, but constraints on 
these rights continue to escalate. You could just go down 
the list – and I think that’s largely because of the absence 
of a shared vision and game plan.”
Chris M. Burch Photography
Nikke PaulaElvert Barnes Photography
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1. Take the risk to invest capital and other  resources in bold and visionary ideas.  
2. Hire staff with social movement experience to  maximize the quality of the partnership between  
funder and grantee as well as the alignment of funder  
and advocate strategy. 
3. Put money into messaging research and appreciate that it’s expensive and takes time. 
4. Support public education efforts that are data- driven, thoroughly tested, specifically tailored to 
targeted communities and sectors, and delivered by  
respected and believable messengers. These kind of  
efforts can effectively move hearts and minds. 
5. Invest early in high-impact, multi-dimensional  public education efforts to move the needle of  
public opinion well before a legislative or ballot struggle.
6. Use the influence of foundations to convene,  support and push collaboration. 
7. Play a major role in ensuring that all parts of a movement are fully developed, funded and working 
in sync (research, polling, messaging development and 
delivery, coalition building, organizing and field work,  
state infrastructure capacity, and litigation, etc.).
8. Exercise strategic and grantmaking discipline,  while reserving enough flexibility to quickly and  
effectively respond to changes on the ground. 
9. Evaluate the inevitable setbacks, learn from  them and embrace the concept of “losing for-
ward,” using each effort to put grantees and advocates  
in a better position to win the next battle.  
10. Seek legal counsel experienced in tax rules  governing advocacy funding so grantmaking  
can be potent without crossing any legal lines. 
11. Adequately staff funder collaboratives and  make consensus a goal, but not a mandate.
Is the CMC a model for other social justice philanthropy?
“Definitely,” Overbrook Foundation’s Foster  
said. “And I just don’t see that model used much in 
other social justice movements. It’s a shame, because 
bringing people together to fund in a collaborative 
way, behind a collaborative vision, leverages dollars 
exponentially. It also creates relationships of trust 
among funders that then can be used in other ways 
and in other related causes.”
“The CMC – for worse and better – remained pretty 
small,” said Roger Doughty, executive director of the 
Horizons Foundation and a CMC funder member. 
“That was worse because we couldn’t recruit more do-
nors – meaning less money – but better for helping keep 
a strong sense of connectedness among the funders.”
CMC leaders would be the first to acknowledge that 
the CMC model is not a “one size fits all” solution for 
other social justice movements. But the journey toward 
marriage equality revealed some key lessons learned 
that other funders can and should consider: 
Greg Kendall-Ball
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A fond farewell
It’s an extraordinary thing in a social justice move-
ment when you actually win and can say, “OK, our job 
is over now.”
“The job of securing full equality for LGBT people is not 
over; the job of defending the marriage win is not over,” 
said Luna Yasui, program officer at the Ford Foundation. 
“But the CMC’s job, which was to achieve marriage 
equality coast to coast, is over.”
In the coming months, both the CMC and Freedom to  
Marry will close up shop.
Di Donato hopes that all the funders involved in the 
CMC will continue to devote significant resources to 
issues of LGBT equality – both formal legal equality as 
well as lived equality – but he sees no reason to morph 
the CMC into something else and just keep on going.
“Sometimes in the nonprofit universe, no one seems  
to ever know how to stop and close anything down, even 
when the objective is met,” he said.
Upon making the decision to shut down, he thought 
there would be complicated emotions for him as well  
as others, given how hard everyone worked to make  
the dream of marriage equality into a reality. “People 
have said to me, ‘It must be bittersweet’ especially as  
I have been involved in this work for eight years. And 
my response is, ‘No, it’s just sweet, sweet, sweet.’” 
Sarah Deragon
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Our Vision: Advancing justice through human rights, democracy and peace.
Founded in 1997, Proteus has brought together more than $133 million towards the realization of this vision.  
We partner with individual donors and foundations to achieve their goals through strategy development, research 
and fund management. Proteus specializes in tailoring responsive, multi-dimensional, high-impact grantmaking  
initiatives. Proteus also offers the ability for funders to integrate support for lobbying activity. Our work advances 
some of the most complex and cutting edge issues at the forefront of democracy and social change.
Collaborative Grant Making: Effective. Efficient. Responsive.
When funders pool resources and draw on collective ideas, insights and energy, it creates a collaborative  
dynamic that maximizes participants’ investment dollars and strategy development leading to broader impact  
than each donor partner might have individually. For this reason, Proteus integrates a collaborative approach  
in all of our work. The result is: 
• Greater impact as part of a coordinated, comprehensive and sophisticated strategy;
• Greater thought leadership in the movement and the field;
• Capacity for in-depth due diligence and thoughtful oversight of grantmaking;
• Flexibility to incubate new ideas and take bold action;
• Responsive grantmaking that aligns strategy with real-time movement dynamics; and
• Empowerment of participants through leverage of investments.
Civil Marriage Collaborative: Focused. Responsive. Victorious.
Proteus Fund is proud to have served as the home for the Civil Marriage Collaborative throughout the  
successful quest for marriage equality. The CMC maintained a laser focus on funding a wide array of public  
education strategies and tactics, including research, message development and deployment, grassroots and  
grasstops mobilization, coalition and alliance-building and related efforts. In every respect, CMC  
distinguished itself as an example of how diverse funders can collaborate and, by joining forces, succeed.
 
Proteus Fund congratulates the Civil Marriage Collaborative on the critical 
role it played in achieving this great human and civil rights victory.
About Proteus Fund
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To the thousands of individuals and institutions who took a stand for marriage equality, thank you!
Thank you to CMC Funding Partners
Anonymous Donors
The Atlantic Philanthropies
Calamus Foundation (DE)
Calamus Foundation (NY)
Columbia Foundation
David Bohnett Foundation
Evelyn and Walter Haas, Jr. Fund
Ford Foundation
Gill Foundation
Horizons Foundation
Johnson Family Foundation
Kevin J. Mossier Foundation
Open Society Foundations
The Overbrook Foundation
Additional thanks to…
Equality California
Freedom to Marry
Mainers United for Marriage
National Center for Lesbian Rights
To view the accompanying documentary:
HEARTS & MINDS: The Story of the Civil Marriage 
Collaborative, please visit www.proteusfund.org/cmc
For questions and additional information:
Please email: info@proteusfund.org
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